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Evaluation of 20 years Copenhagen criteria

Posted by Blogactiv Team on 22/05/13

By Nienke van Leeuwaarden

I recently read the book “EU Accession Negotiations (A Handbook)” written by Prof. Vasile Puscas. The material – well structured, accessible and clear – provides a comprehensive overview of EU accession negotiations, combining theory with practical experience. The main aim of the book could be considered to make the know-how regarding EU accession negotiations accessible to the larger public.

The content is clearly structured and the author guides the reader through all aspects of EU accession negotiations from beginning to end, including a technical view of the negotiations.

After the introduction of the concept ‘negotiation’ in the European context, Puscas gives an overview of the European environment: its institutions, its policies and its decision-making mechanisms.

In chapter 5 Puscas logically connects the theory from the earlier chapters to practice as he introduces ‘European Accession Negotiations’. Covering “who is who”, the parties involved, strategy and tactics, criteria, positions, transition periods and derogations, as well as the final stage of accession negotiations, the following chapters really dig into the accession process.

Including a chapter on integration capacity and effective implementation of the negotiated commitments really completes the journey through the process of accession negotiations. And as a bonus, he included a case-study on the newest member of the EU – Croatia.

Puscas successfully applies critical thinking and an interdisciplinary approach to the subject. Not only is this book an asset to those involved in EU accession negotiations, but to the academic world as well. In fact it is an asset to anybody interested in the process of EU accession negotiations.

Enlargement & Neighbours, EU Treaty & Institutions
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Enrico Letta: vrai changement ou nouvelles élections

Posted by Blogactiv Team on 07/05/13

Par Alessandra Flora, en Italie

Le nouveau gouvernement Italien présidié par Enrico Letta se trouve face à des nombreaux défis. La coalition composée par le Partito Democratico, par le Popolo della Libertà e par Scelta Civica doit, avant de tout, combattre la plaie du chômage, surtout le chômage qui atteint les jeunes générations. Un problème lié strictement à la faible croissance de l’économie italienne, qui’il faut réanimer sans aucune hésitation.

L’équipe de Letta est désormais complète: maintenant il faut que la coalition travaille sans sursis pour intervenir sur le marché du travail en apportant, aussi tôt que possibile, les modifications necessaires à la loi qui prend son nom du dernière ministre du Travail, Elsa Fornero. Aujourd’hui presque tout le monde croit que les restrictions prévues par cette loi ne s’adaptent pas à la situation stagnante dans laquelle se trouvent nos entreprises.

Les petites et moyennes entreprises sont accablées par les taxes et attendent depuis longtemps les payments des dettes de l’Administration Publique. Grâce aux dernières actions du gouvernement Monti, en mars 2013 la situation a été débloquée, mais c’est encore tôt pour voir un soulagement.

Il y a aussi d’autres problèmes, comme la taxe sur la proprieté immobilière, l’IMU appliqué par le dernier gouvernement de Mario Monti, mais voté soit par le Partito Democratico de Letta, soit par le Popolo de la Libertà de Berlusconi. Un sujet très délicat, qui est devenu objet d’un accrochage politique, presque un bouc émissaire.

Le premier message de Letta aux leaders éuropéens (Merkel, Hollande, Barroso) donne de l’espoir à notre pays, qui en a assez d’austerité e de sacrifices.

On demande à ce gouvernement d’éviter les gaspillages et les privilèges du passé, de mettre tout en œuvre dans la lutte à la corruption e de s’engager pour de vrai, en écoutant la souffrance de millions de familles et des travailleurs.

french
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New vaccine introductions mark World Immunization Week

Posted by Blogactiv Team on 22/04/13

Guest post by Dagfinn Høybråten, Chair of the GAVI Alliance Board and Secretary General of the Nordic Council of Ministers. He was previously Norway’s Minister of Health.

World Immunization Week, which is being celebrated around the globe this week, is an important opportunity to highlight the power of immunisation in protecting children against life-threatening diseases, including rotavirus diarrhoea and pneumococcal disease, two of the leading child killers.

It is impressive and encouraging to see how governments, development partners, international organisations, manufacturers, health experts and civil society are all uniting around one important goal – universal immunisation coverage. Every child, everywhere deserves a healthy start in life. There is no reason why children in poor countries should die from vaccine-preventable diseases in the 21^st century.

Although vaccines are widely available in high-income countries, the unacceptable reality is that 22 million children under five in developing countries are missing out on basic vaccines. For this reason, the GAVI Alliance is committed to working closely with countries to reach the hard to reach with vaccines – including children in remote areas and marginalised populations, and improve communities’ understanding about the health benefits of immunisation.

The good news is that, this week alone, four countries – Haiti, Somalia, Uganda and Zambia – will introduce new vaccines with GAVI support. Over the past year, Haiti has really stepped up to the plate in making immunisation a priority after the devastations caused by the earthquake that hit its capital, Port au Prince, in January 2010.

This time last year during World Immunization Week I was in Haiti representing GAVI at a vaccination campaign against measles, rubella and polio organized by Haiti’s Ministry of Health. It is inspiring to see that one year on the country has made great strides in rolling out the pentavalent vaccine and is now introducing the rotavirus vaccine, protecting infants from the leading cause of severe diarrhoea, which is often fatal for children under five. To date, GAVI has supported 14 countries to introduce the rotavirus vaccine and plans to reach 5 million children with the vaccine.

During World Immunization Week this year, political leaders and global health experts will gather in Abu Dhabi for the Global Vaccine Summit to celebrate immunisation successes, including the unrelenting efforts of the polio eradication partners over the past few years. This global push around polio eradication underscores the true power of immunisation – the idea that diseases can be literally wiped off the face of the earth.

GAVI is committed to supporting the polio “endgame” by strengthening routine immunisation services. These services are essential to complete eradication and ensure that countries remain polio free. Investing in routine immunisation programmes will not only help us deliver the full package of vaccines to children, but eradicate polio once and for all.

I am delighted to see that President Barroso and Commissioner Piebalgs of the European Commission (EC) will take part in the Summit, demonstrating the EC’s strong commitment to support immunisation. I was very pleased to meet with Bono and Commissioner Piebalgs last year in October and to discuss with the Commissioner the power of immunisation.

Scaling up immunisation programmes in poor countries would not be possible without continued support from GAVI’s generous donors, including 10 EU member states and the European Institutions. Since 2003, the European Institutions have committed EUR 82.5 million to support GAVI’s mission of ensuring that children of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group receive the basic package of vaccines, including EUR 10 million for pneumococcal vaccines in ACP countries, pledged in June 2011.

We are grateful that most of GAVI’s donors provide long-term predictable funding, thereby ensuring that routine immunisation programmes are sustained with a reliable supply of quality, low-cost vaccines.

World Immunization Week is a chance to celebrate global achievements in vaccination, but also an opportunity to acknowledge how much we still need to do.

Dagfinn Høybråten is the Chair of the GAVI Alliance Board. He is Secretary General of the Nordic Council of Ministers and was previously Norway’s Minister of Health.

English, EU, Health & Lifestyle
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Capital requirements rules are key to new EU banking stability measures – here are the details

Posted by Blogactiv Team on 19/04/13

By Thomas Schuster

Basically, the European Union intends to adopt the Basel III accord. For that reason the European Commission drafted a capital requirements directive CRD IV (European Commission 2011a) and a capital requirements regulation CRR (European Commission 2011b) in 2011.

Both the directive and the regulation were negotiated under the co-decision rule. Parliament and Council negotiated the two bills in the trilogue framework, i.e. representatives of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission discussed the bills and finally agreed on a compromise in March 2013 (Council of the European Union 2013a and 2013b). The trilogue framework provides that both the European Parliament and the European Council have to formally accept the final compromise. The Parliament approved the compromise on 16 April 2013. We expect that the Council will vote on the rules in May 2013.

EU proposals in line with Basel III rules

The compromise fully adopts the new capital requirements: CET 1 capital must be 4.5% of RWA, additional tier 1 capital amounts to 1.5% of RWA, and tier 2 capital shall be equal to 2%.

The three capital buffers are also adopted: The capital conservation buffer consists of 2.5% of CET 1 capital with respect to RWA. The responsible financial authorities of the member states can establish a countercyclical buffer ranging between 0 and 2.5% of RWA, and the capital buffer of between 1.0 to 3.5% for global systemically important financial institutions is also implemented into EU law.

EU proposals which deviate from Basel III rules

Basel III defines the leverage ratio as tier 1 capital divided by total exposure (without risk weighting). This includes total assets plus off-balance sheet items (Basel III, paragraphs 153-164[1]). The CRR determines the leverage ratio in the same way but states no quantitative minimum level which must be met (CRR Art. 416[2]). It is planned that the European Commission shall – if appropriate – submit a legislative proposal to make a minimum leverage ratio of 3% a binding element as of 2018. Moreover, the European Commission considers setting up several different levels of leverage ratios based on the business model, risk profile, and size of the banks (European Commission, 2013, 22).

The EU defines the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) in the same way as the Basel Committee: The stock of high-quality liquid assets must be at least as large as the total net cash outflow over the next 30 calendar days under a significantly severe stress scenario (BCBS, 2010, Para. 15, CRR Art. 401). However, the list of assets that are considered as high-quality liquid assets is far more restricted than the list of the Basel rules. Thus, government bonds of the member states play a relatively more prominent role. In contrast, assets from investment firms or insurance undertakings are banned (CRR Art. 404, Points 1 and 2). Moreover, the new EU regulation does not set a limit for the exposure of banks to single debtors if the debtor is a sovereign. For other debtors a large exposure limit of 25% applies.

The CRR only loosely describes the net stable funding ratio. The clear definition of the Basel III accord is not adopted. It is only stated that the “institutions shall ensure that long term obligations are adequately met with a diversity of stable funding instruments under both normal and stressed conditions” (CRR Art. 401 a). It is planned that the European Commission shall – if appropriate – submit a legislative proposal to set up details of the net stable funding ratio by 31 December 2016 (CRR Art. 481 a).

New EU proposals compared to Basel III

The European Union also plans to establish two new measures not mentioned by Basel III. First, an overall macroprudential systemic risk buffer shall be introduced. It is defined as CET 1 capital in relation to RWA. It can be binding for the whole financial sector or for one or more subsets of the sector. It shall be established to prevent systemic or macroprudential risks in a specific member state. The systemic risk buffer for global systemically important institutions G-SIIs[3] will be generally a subset of this overall systemic risk buffer. The national financial authority can set up the overall macroprudential systemic risk buffer in the range between 0 and 3% until the end of 2014. Afterwards, the systemic risk buffer can range between 0 and 5% (CRD Art. 124 d).

Ratios of the macroprudential risk buffer greater than 5% need the authorization of the EU Commission (CRR Recital 10b). Moreover, the national financial authority has to inform the Commission, the European Banking Authority (EBA), and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) about the measure and give detailed reasons why it wants to set a buffer rate above 5% (CRD Art. 124 d, Points 9 and 10).

Second, a risk buffer for other (than globally) systemically important institutions
(O-SII) is planned. It consists of CET 1 capital, can vary between 0 and 2%, and will generally also be a subset of the overall macroprudential systemic risk buffer. National financial authorities can determine systemically important banks within their jurisdiction and can impose this additional buffer if they consider it necessary. The buffer will be introduced from January 2016 onwards (CRD Art. 124).[4]

Evaluation of the suggested measures

The proposals of the European Union to implement the Basel III accord into European law lead in the right direction. This relates to the reform items where the EU follows the Basel III rules and particularly to the optional capital requirements going beyond the international ones. However, there is still much room for improvement. In fact, some of the planned rules should be urgently revised.

The risk weight of EU member states’ government bonds denominated in the domestic currency is 0%, independent of their rating (CRR Art. 109 Point 4). In contrast, already the Basel II rules (which remain unaltered by Basel III) postulate risk weights of up to 150%. To deviate from this prescription is clearly not acceptable. As the current sovereign debt crisis has shown, also government bonds bear the risk of default. Moreover, banks and their national sovereigns are connected in a potentially vicious circle where bank crises can lead to sovereign debt crises and vice versa. Thus, there should be no discrimination between government bonds (risk weight of 0%) and bonds issued by financial institutions (risk weights ranging from 20 to 150% (CRD Art. 115)). Hence, risk weights based on their rating should be introduced on government bonds as prescribed in Basel III. The phasing in until 2019 can ensure that the current euro debt crisis will not be aggravated by the new rules.
The liquidity coverage ratio also prefers government debt compared to the Basel rules. Basel III sets up a list of high-quality liquid assets containing government bonds, corporate bonds, common shares, and residential mortgage backed securities (BCBS, 2013, 12-16). The EU list mainly contains government bonds. Under certain restrictions, assets from financial institutions also count as liquid assets. Assets from investment firms, insurance undertakings and financial holding companies are, however, excluded (CRR, Art. 404). There is no point in being that restrictive and in mainly concentrating on government securities. Hence, the list on what counts as high-quality liquid assets should be more in line with the list set up in the Basel III accord. However, only assets of very high quality should be eligible.
Moreover, also concerning the new liquidity provisions, there should be a large exposure limit also to government bonds of individual countries if these bonds serve as liquid assets.
The EU should also principally introduce a minimum leverage ratio of 3%, as put forward by the Basel Committee. The big advantage of this leverage ratio is that it can be computed easily since the assets are not risk-weighted and can hence be compared easily to detect banks with excessive leverages. The plans of the European Commission to set different minimum leverage ratios for different business models and risk profiles should make sure that the leverage ratio deviates from 3% only in exceptional circumstances.
The EU proposal’s definition on what counts as CET 1 capital is wider than the Basel definition. Consequently, the BCBS judged that the EU definition of capital is materially non-compliant with the Basel III accord (BCBS, 2012, 12). For two reasons the definition of capital should be in line with Basel III. First, financial institutions should only use equity capital which can really buffer losses. So the definition of capital should be very restrictive to meet this criterion. Second, the fact that the capital of European banks does not meet the Basel III criteria sends out a problematic signal to the worldwide financial community: European banks tend to bear a higher risk of bankruptcy than their counterparts in the other G20 countries. Consequently, the financial markets could charge a higher risk premium to European banks, which would increase their capital costs and weaken their ability to compete internationally. Thus, market pressure might eventually enforce a stricter definition of CET 1 capital.
In the same document as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the Basel Committee criticizes the EU’s internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to measure credit risk as materially non-compliant with Basel III (BCBS, 2012, 12). For example, the BCBS criticizes that the EU allows a bank using the IRB approach to permanently apply the standardized approach even if the use of the standardized approach leads to lower risk weights. Under Basel III this is not possible. The standardized approach can particularly lead to lower risk weights if applied to exposures of central governments, regional governments, and local authorities. As a consequence, the amount of risk-weighted assets can be smaller, so that the banks would have to hold less capital to meet the minimum capital requirements. Again, this non-compliance sends out the signal that European banks are more exposed to financial distress and consequently the capital costs are higher. Taking into account these arguments the EU rules concerning the IRB approach should meet the blueprint of Basel III.
If all capital requirements and the various capital buffers are added, the maximum amount of equity capital is 18%. The European legislator wants the member states not to go further (BCBS, 2013, 11). So if member states want to exceed this threshold (e.g. setting up a systemic risk buffer of more than 5%), they need the authorization of the European Commission (CRR Recital 10b). Furthermore, they have to provide detailed reasons why their banks need more capital. Some member states – e.g. Spain and Great Britain – already announced to set up stricter capital requirements for their banks (European Commission, 2013, 11). It is not sensible to restrict them. If a banking sector of a member state is far more risky and volatile, a national authority should be able to easily increase the capital requirements of domestic banks. Consequently, the rules of exceeding the systemic risk buffer beyond 5% should be modified. It should be sufficient to inform the European Commission about this step and to provide reasons.
The net stable funding ratio is not clearly defined in the EU proposal. The regulation should come up with a clear definition, as given in the Basel III framework. Moreover, so far the rules about stable funding are only provisional. The EU should make a clear commitment to introduce the net stable funding ratio in line with Basel III and implement it in the revised regulation.
Basel III applies the capital conservation buffer to all financial institutions, irrespective of their size. The EU directive plans that member states may exempt small and medium-sized investment firms to maintain the capital conservation buffer (CRD Art. 123 Point 1a). There is no reason to make an exception concerning smaller firms. Therefore, the EU should stick to the same rule and impose the capital conservation buffer to all financial institutions.

10. Finally, it is stated that gender balance in management boards of banks and investment companies (board of directors and supervisory boards) is important. The directive calls for a threshold for the representation of the underrepresented gender (CRD Recital 45a). However, a specific threshold is not specified. The demand for this threshold should be dropped. The management board members of financial institutions should be chosen only based on their knowledge and competence, irrespective of age, gender, cultural, geographic, educational, and professional background.

Thomas Schuster is Professor of Quantitative Methods at the University of Applied Sciences Bad Honnef ? Bonn and Visiting Research Fellow at the Cologne Institute of Economic Research.

[1] Basel III paragraphs refer to BCBS, 2011a.

[2] CRR articles can be found in Council of the European Union (2013b).

[3] The EU term G-SII is the same as the Basel expression G-SIFI.

[4] CRD articles are laid down in Council of the European Union (2013a).

EU Priorities 2020, Euro & Finance
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Mario Monti’s mistake

Posted by Blogactiv Team on 16/04/13

By Alessandra Flora

Everybody across Europe knows Mario Monti. Beyond doubt he’s one of the most respected and admired economists and politicians.

In 2011, when Italy’s Head of State, Giorgio Napolitano, nominated him prime Minister, after Silvio Berlusconi’s resignation, Monti inherited many problems from the previous governments, above all a very high sovereign debt, an increasing unemployment rate and a low productivity index. Like other prime leaders (Hollande, Merkel, Obama) he had to face one of the worst economic crisis of the last 50 years, maybe the worst. His popularity declined over a few months. Maybe the cure was worse than the disease.

At the end of 2012 Monti decided to candidate himself for the political elections in March 2013, allying with the Centre parties: Luca Cordero di Montezemolo’s “Italia Futura” and Pierferdinando Casini’s party. Monti thought that by joining his forces with the Liberal Parties he could win the elections. But he was wrong, mainly because these parties weren’t strong enough. Montezemolo’s “Italia Futura” is a small, recent political movement, maybe too close to the upper class and the industrialists. Besides, for young people Casini’s party is too close to the old Democrazia Cristiana and too similar to the old-style politics.

Although he is still popular abroad, Monti was heavily defeated at last elections. Even though he rescued Italy’s economy from default, he lost his previous popularity among people. Today Italians pay the highest taxes and they suffer the highest unemployement rate of last 20 years. Everyday almost 400 SME are closing due to the crisis. Many entrepreneurs are tragically forced to commit suicide. Italian economy is depressed and young people have to leave their country and look for a job abroad. It is clearly not Monti’s fault, but the Italian electorate doesn’t want to be governed by him anymore.

A few days ago Monti declared he was going to leave “Scelta Civica”, the party he had contributed to found. In the future he will be just life senator. He seems saddened and tired by the whole situation. He hopes the next government will tell Italians the truth, as he did.

Last year he was the most appropriate candidate for the role of Head of State, after Giorgio Napolitano. Now it is not so.

People wonder for what reason Monti decided to candidate himself. He wasn’t elected by the population; he was just nominated by the Head of State in a specific moment of political uncertainty. His government was a “technical” one. After only one year, his austerity was too much for the Italians. Maybe this has been a fatal error.

It’s a pity that there are long odds to see him as the new President of the Republic. He would have been recognized as an eminent representative of Italy everywhere.

English, Member States
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Another Spring: The Middle East between history of revolts and future geopolitics

Posted by Blogactiv Team on 15/04/13

By Fadi Elhusseini

Regularly, when spring comes, people expect flowers and green shoots and optimism prevails. Alas, things in the Middle East are quite different. With every spring that comes, people recall the outbreak of the first spark of the current “Arab Spring” that started in Tunisia 2011 and swept Arab countries, wondering what will come after and where it will hit next. After being caught by surprise, numerous scholars and observers have been writing extensively about the “Arab Spring”, trying to uncover its wellsprings and link it to other incidents and circumstances, in an attempt to read the portents of the rough and tumble of the Middle East. Yet, I contend, this pursuit is often a vain one especially given that the available literature is not yet adequate to explain the various aspects of what has gone before. Fully aware of this gap, I aim to reveal first of all a number of the missing contours and dynamics in order to further articulate the term “Arab Spring”. In the same vein, I will also try to analyze the current political and geopolitical conditions in the Middle East in an effort to draw some relevant conclusions and provide a working prognosis of the future course of events in the region.

It can be said that the events of the current Arab Spring are molded within two composite layers, each with its own features, characteristics and hypotheses. The first layer comes within a global nexus. Arguably, the current spate of revolts in the Middle East might be considered as the fourth wave of democratization, with reference to the concept developed by Samuel M. Huntington in his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century published in 1991. According to Huntington, each wave was followed by a reverse one. Huntington argues that the first wave occurred between 1828-1926, with its roots in the recent French and American revolutions. This wave swept Europe and Latin America, and was marked by military coups. It lost momentum in the interwar period between World War I and World War II when a number of dictators rose to power, which led to a shift away from democracy toward traditional authoritarian or new ideologically-driven, mass-based totalitarian regimes.

The second wave took place from 1943-1962, and featured coups and the establishment of authoritarianism across Latin America, South and East Asia and allied occupation post- World War II. Huntington proposes that the beginning of the end of Western colonial rule produced a number of new states with democratic tendencies. Yet, he argues that political development, especially in Latin America, took on an authoritarian cast, and the decolonization of Africa led to the largest multiplication of authoritarian governments in history. Accordingly, one third of the working democracies in 1958 had become authoritarian by the 1970s.

The third wave between 1970s and 1980s manifested in the collapse of the former Soviet Union and swept Southern Europe, South America and Africa. In effect, a number of scholars (among them Dr. Ali Sarihan of Qatar’s Georgetown University) have opted to insert the current Arab revolts within this framework. They opine that with the onset of the current Arab Spring, the fourth wave of transformation or “Democratization of Communist and Islamic Regimes” began as per the fact that it has an impact on other regions and inspired revolts and demonstrations in Europe, Asia, Latin and North America, it gained its global contours.

The second layer operates within a regional setting. Within this framework, the current “Arab Spring” has proved to have its own characteristics and features which require further analysis. It can be argued that the current round of revolts now termed “Arab Spring” or “Arab Awakening” does not constitute the first manifestation of Arab mass protests that have led to a change in the social and political structure of Arab societies. In fact it comes as the third wave of Arab mass revolts each possessing its own grounds, circumstances, ideologies, slogans and outcomes.

The first wave of Arab revolts took place in 1914, and was called, “the Great Arab Revolution”. What characterizes this wave is that it had a leader, Sharif Hussein, who led the revolution and the main target was ending Ottoman rule in Arabia. This wave coincided with two major events, one global and another regional. World War I was the major global event, while the waning and finally the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (Pax-Ottoman) was the major regional event. The old adage of “the road to hell is paved with good intentions” was conspicuously manifested in the course of the events of the first wave of revolts in the Arab region as will be shown shortly.

It can be said that such a myopic wave was externally driven, as the revolutions were supported by the British, who were aiming to end and replace the Ottomans presence in the region. For all that, the effect of the revolts was ephemeral as they were bereft of their main goal of independence. This fact was referred to by Dr. Mehmet Sahin, Turkey’s Gazi University, in his article “1950-1960 Arab Revolutions and 2011 Arab Spring: Similarities and Differences”, where he pointed out the final result of the Great Arab revolution, “… was only a change of the master. Instead of Muslims (Turks) the new masters were Christians (British and French)”.

In this context, a number of slogans and ideologies were endorsed through this wave and the main slogan was nationalism. This slogan was deemed important in order to encourage Arabs to get rid of any other subordination, mainly Islamism, which inevitably meant yanking out any connection to the Ottoman Sultan and the warding off of any yearnings for the Ottoman heritage.

The second wave of Arab revolts took place in the 50′s and 60′s, and was called “the Arab Spring” by a French writer. In his book “Un printemps arabe” published in 1959, Jacques Benoist-Méchin describes the Arab revolts that took place in the “Arab” Middle East, and tries to link them to the European Revolutions of 1848, known as the ‘Spring of Nations’ or ‘Springtime of the Peoples’. These revolts inspired new revolutions in former Czechoslovakia and led to what was best known as the “Prague Spring”. The Arab Spring of the 50′s and 60′s came after two major events, one regional and another global. The latter was World War II, which had a great impact on the revolts and caused them to be driven by external factors. In other words, foreign powers and forces encouraged and even stimulated these revolts as Communist powers wanted to fight the Western presence and colonization in the Middle East. For that reason, ‘Fighting Imperialism’ and ‘Progressivism’ were among other key slogans and themes of this period.

Yet, the major regional event was the establishment of the State of Israel in the center of the “Arab” Middle East. This led to the emergence of another slogan which became afterwards an ideology – “Arabism”. Arabism was coined, and adeptly promoted by the late Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser (hitherto, his combined notion of Arabism and socialism was called Nasserism). His name was largely aligned with the second wave of Arab revolts, and his ideology widespread struck a chord with and inspired other leaders who steered revolts in other countries in the Middle East. In effect, Arabism gained popularity in Arab streets as it developed as a natural ideology and movement to counter the Zionism which attended the establishment of the State of Israel. The revolts targeted not Israel but the other colonial presence in the Middle East deemed to be the real instigator and creator of Zionism and hence the State of Israel. In this regard, a number of crowns, condemned by their alliance or reliance on Western “imperialistic” powers, paid the price and were toppled in Libya, Iraq, and primarily Egypt.

The current wave of Arab revolts, which erupted in Tunisia in 2011, has its own characteristics. First and foremost, and unlike the previous two waves, the current revolts have neither a well-known leader, nor an external provenance. They were stimulated solely by internal dynamics as proposed by Dr. Nadia Mostafa, Cairo University, at the ‘Second Annual Conference of Insight Turkey’ in Cairo on January 30, 2012. This view was also put forward by Prof. Ziya Onis in a workshop entitled: ‘Working Together for Democracy in the Arab World’ in Ankara on October 27, 2011. Dr. Onis believes that the current Arab revolts are “internally driven”. Social, economic, youth bulge and the remarkable evolution in the means of communication were among many crucial factors that led to the eruption of the current wave of revolts. They were not instigated by a specific country or model.

Similar to previous revolts, the current wave came in the aftermath of global and regional transformations. On the global level, the collapse of the former Soviet Union produced unlimited repercussions as most maladroit Arab regimes were lying idle and could not adapt themselves to such massive changes. Against the emergent dynamism, they remained static, failing to sense the seriousness of these reverberations, and could not adjust their status quo ante policies, practices and affiliations. On the regional level, the major transformation was manifested in the US occupation of Iraq and the collapse of the first dictatorship in the region. One of the important ramifications of the latter was the fading of the praxis of “Arabism”. To elaborate, Saddam Hussein of Iraq was one of the staunchest supporters and believers in “Arabism”, and when he was attacked by the US, other Arab countries either watched or supported the American invasion. This led to a great shock for those who still believed in “Arabism” and significantly helped to strengthen two main ideologies in the region: Islamism and liberal modernism. In addition to Islamism and modernism, the revolts produced social demands including human rights, democracy and independence (from foreign influence) that helped fuel the revolts targeted against corrupted regimes (Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria) which were deemed responsible for their stagnant social and economic conditions and known for their alliance with the West.

Inter alia, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the fading of Arabism, toppling a number of Arab regimes and the waning of historical Arab leader states led to a power vacuum in the region and the intervention of foreign powers (either regional or global) became inevitable. Traditional super and global powers are still seeking a bigger, newer, role in the Middle East, in response to the changes. The US, Russia, China and Europe compete among each other in order to guarantee the larger scale of leverage and wider foothold in the region, at times using their soft power instruments, at others their historical cooperation, not forgetting economic incentives. In his article in the Russian Odanko magazine entitled ‘Obama et Poutine vont-ils se partager le Proche-Orient?’, the French writer Thierry Meyssan underscores this hypothesis and suggests a new scenario for the division of the Middle East between the U.S. and Russia.

Turkey, Iran and Israel, on the other hand, are the most favored regional powers with this end in view. However, Israel’s chances hinge greatly on a peace agreement with the Palestinians, not to mention the obvious fact that Israel is culturally different from the rest of the countries in the region. History, culture and religion outweigh Iran’s odds over Israel, as it has also succeeded in building a network of allies within the region. However, Iran does not seem to be an appealing model for many Arabs, especially when it comes to freedom, human rights, economy and relations with the rest of the world, especially the West. Turkey, who is part of the culture, history and religion of the region, appears to have the best odds in her favor. It presents an appealing model for its democracy, freedom and modernity, human rights, booming economy and relations with the West, along with the presence of Islamic elites in power. Yet, the term “the Turkish Model” has been overplayed and has put Turkey’s popularity on the line. In other words, and among other challenges, Turkey’s potential in the Middle East is marred by its explicit zeal and overt use of its soft power, which may lead to untoward effects.

Yet, treading the path into the Middle East should be charted carefully. It is well known for being one of the most volatile regions, and for its complexity is often described as “a Quick Sand”. At this juncture, it isn’t be difficult to fathom the feeling of frustration that permeates nearly every Arab, who believes that their destiny should not hinge on others, but remain in their own hands. Lamentably, this desired outcome will not materialize until historical Arab leader states rise and shake the dust of weakness and reluctance from their shoulders.

April, 2013

Fadi Elhusseini is a diplomat working as a Political and Media Counselor in Turkey. He is an Associate Fellow- Research at the Institute for Middle East Studies in Canada. He held several positions in the Palestinian National Authority and was the executive director of the Palestinian Council on Foreign Relations. Elhusseini is a former lecturer at Al-Azhar University in Gaza and is currently a registered PhD student at the University of Sunderland in the United Kingdom.

Twitter@FElhusseini

English, Global Europe
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Child poverty in Europe: our future is now

Posted by Blogactiv Team on 11/04/13

By Jana Hainsworth

At least the EU institutions have understood the urgency of the issue: child poverty is rising and we need to invest now to avoid long-term social and economic decline. Today one in four children in the EU is at risk of poverty or already experiencing it. That equals 25.3 million children. The economic crisis and government austerity measures are exacerbating existing inequalities in society. More and more families are struggling to make ends meet.

We urge EU Member States to act now

A recent European Commission Recommendation calls on EU governments to “invest in children – to break the cycle of disadvantage” http://www.ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServl…]. A Recommendation is not binding on member states but governments will do well to take notice. Research has shown that making appropriate investments to prevent child poverty today will save public expenditure in the future, such as through reduced health care or social protection costs.

Today and tomorrow (10-11 April 2013) many NGOs will be participating at “Taking action to fight child poverty and to promote child well-being” , a political roundtable and seminar, organized by Eurochild, EAPN and UNICEF under the patronage of the Irish Presidency of the EU. There, we will stress the importance of this European Commission’s Recommendation and its implementation at Member States level.

What is child poverty?

Eurochild and EAPN take this major event as an opportunity to launch their explanatory “Towards Children’s Well-Being in the EU, which aims to raise public awareness on child poverty in Europe and on the devastating effects it has on lives of children and families as well as on society as a whole. It suggests concrete solutions at EU, national, local and individual levels to support the concrete implementation of the European Commission Recommendation.

Keep up the momentum

EU institutions have acknowledged that child poverty is a priority issue. Eurochild wants to keep up the momentum and ensure national actors apply the necessary pressure on decision makers to invest in children and promote child-well-being. Children – and society as a whole – cannot afford that the EC Recommendation remains a paper exercise. Children need practical implementation now.

We hope you will participate by following our event on Twitter:

#childpoverty2013 to follow the event on 10-11 April 2013

#CPexplainer for the lunch of our explainer “Towards Children’s Well-Being in the EU”

Jana Hainsworth is Secretary General of Eurochild, a non-profit network of organisations and individuals working across Europe to improve the quality of life of children and young people.

English, Uncategorized
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Ten little Indians: Napolitano’s choice

Posted by Blogactiv Team on 02/04/13

By Alessandra Flora

Italy’s head of State, Giorgio Napolitano, appointed two commissions composed by 10 wise men aimed at sorting out the political crisis and proposing new urgent reforms.

Furthermore, Napolitano did not resign and announced he would stay until the end of his mandate, on May 15^th.

That decision is the proof of President’s foresight. As a father and a real patriot, he did not escape his responsibility and would not leave Italy in a mess. He knows very well that his country is still exposed to high risks of speculation on the financial markets.

No doubt Mr Napolitano has been among the best serving Presidents over the past 30 years or so. During his seven years in office, he had to face many tough challenges including an extremely difficult decision, taken in October 2011, to make it possible for former European Commissioner Mario Monti to head a technocrat government, following Silvio Berlusconi’s resignation that left Italy in an extremely precarious situation.

There is, however, something that the President could not be proud of. The decision not to include women and young experts in the newly created team of experts is profoundly wrong. It’s true that Napolitano had to act quickly to avoid further delays, but the lack of time does not justify his choice.

Many female politicians, economists and renowned experts such as Emma Bonino, Fiorella Kostoris, Debora Serracchiani, Rosy Bindi, Mercedes Bresso, Diana Bracco, Emma Marcegaglia, Lella Golfo, Susanna Camusso, Milena Gabanelli, Giulia Bongiorno, Luisa Todini, Margherita Hack could well have played important role in the delicate transition.

People here say that could only happen in Italy. Local women must reflect on the roots of the issue and strongly react because all political choices, especially crucial ones, should necessarily represent the society with all its elements.

English
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THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION DONATES EXTRA €10 MILLION TO WFP FOR SYRIAN PEOPLE

Posted by Blogactiv Team on 28/03/13

Syrian refugees using WFP voucher programme to buy food in Iraq. WFP/Dina Elkassaby

By the World Food Programme

BRUSSELS – A contribution of €10 million, announced today, from the European Commission’s Directorate for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), has been welcomed by the United Nations World Food Programme, and brings the Commission’s total assistance to WFP for its Syria operations to almost €42 million since the crisis began two years ago.

This generous contribution will help WFP realise its intention to reach 2.5 million people inside Syria, as well as one million refugees in neighbouring countries, in the coming months.

“This is a critical time for Syrians. Many have been forced to flee their homes and have lost their belongings and they need more help as this crisis enters its third year.” said WFP Executive Director Ertharin Cousin. ”We are determined to continue our life-saving assistance but, until the conflict ends, we can do so only with the generosity of donors like ECHO.”

WFP started its emergency operation inside Syria in August 2011. Since then, it has distributed more than 83,000 metric tons of food to millions of Syrians across the country. Half of the new funding will be used to provide food assistance to the 2.5 million people WFP aims to reach in both government-controlled and contested territory in the coming months.

The other half of today’s funding from ECHO will go to Jordan (€3 million) and Lebanon (€2 million) whereWFP is scaling up efforts to reach 260,000 and 275,000 people respectively. WFP plans to reach up to 800,000 people in the five neighbouring countries by the end of the month.

In the case of vulnerable Syrians who have fled their country, WFP uses ECHO funding for food vouchers, which prove effective where refugees are living among host communities and where food is available in the markets, but they cannot afford it. WFP’s transition from food rations to food vouchers is well underway in many neighbouring countries. ECHO is supporting these WFP projects in Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan.

The World Food Programme, a United Nations body, is the world’s largest humanitarian agency fighting hunger worldwide. The WFP says that every year it feeds more than 90 million people in more than 70 countries.

Development Policy, English, Global Europe
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Malaysia At The Tipping Point?

Posted by Blogactiv Team on 27/03/13

By Nelly Stratieva, Project Coordinator at a management consultancy in Kuala Lumpur

Malaysia, one of the best performing Asian economies and an example for ethnic and religious tolerance, is poised for the most hotly contested elections in its history. For 56 years, since its independence from the British Empire, Malaysia has been ruled by one party – Barisan Nasional (BN). Throughout these decades Malaysia’s population blend of Malay, Chinese and Indian ethnicities has enjoyed impressive ethnic harmony. Malaysia has transformed into one of the Asian ‘tiger’ economies fueled by oil money, expansive public works projects, world class infrastructure and large government-linked companies. The country is in the world top 10 destinations for foreign direct investments (FDIs) and EU’s second largest trading partner in ASEAN. These achievements are mainly due to Malaysia’s long-lasting stability and the government’s pro-business policies.

Enter General Elections 2013, expected to be held this spring Corruption scandals and allegations of cronyism are threatening to topple long-standing BN rule, despite its outstanding economic track record. The opposition coalition, Pakatan Rakyat (PR), has a genuine shot at power but its patchwork of ideologies and unsustainable policy proposals make it an unpredictable contender. Should PR win, could political and racial tensions throw the country into upheaval? Foreign investors are already nervous by the mere threat of instability. Do they have reasons to worry about an opposition party win?

The Wildcard Contender Pakatan Rakyat

The opposition coalition PR is a curious political Frankenstein. It consists of three separate parties, the Malay-backed People’s Justice Party (PKR), the Democratic Action Party (DAP) – a left-leaning Chinese minority party, and the Pan-Malaysian Islamic party (PAS) which has a strong Islamist agenda. The stitches that bind these parties together is their mutual hatred of the ruling BN. Take away this uniting factor and the coalition is left with 3 widely different party ideologies, which calls into question their ability to govern Malaysia together.

Lack of internal cohesion is already visible. The core ideology of PAS is to turn Malaysia into a conservative Muslim state – a line that its two coalition partners have publicly opposed. Even the other two members of PR are not perfect partners. PKR is headed by the controversial Mr Anwar Ibrahim, a former deputy prime minister under BN, who spent the last 10 years in prison for corruption and sodomy (he was acquitted in 2012 on the second charge). He is the most visible and vocal opponent of Barisan Nasional. PKR and DAP agree on a policy platform that doesn’t discriminate between ethnicities but there has already been in-fighting between party leaders for the most powerful position in Malaysia – the seat of the prime minister.

Pakatan Rakyat recently released an election manifesto with its vision for Malaysia’s future. It reads as many election manifestos do. Spending, subsidies, and salaries will be dramatically increased while taxes, fees, and costs will be reduced. How this can be paid for is left unmentioned. While often populist programs are shelved once elections are won, it is currently unknown what PR realistically plans to replace them with if they come into power.

The Old Guard In A Tight Corner

Popular sentiment in favor of re-electing the ruling BN party is nicely summed up in the saying ‘better the devil you know than the devil you don’t’. For all its alleged faults of cronyism and corruption, BN must also be credited for creating one of the most vibrant economies in Asia. Strong GDP growth rates from independence onwards, averaging 6.5% percent, created a stable domestic consumption market that has helped the export-reliant country weather global downturns. Meanwhile, the government’s stake in key industries has helped distribute wealth to more layers of society.

Pressure from the opposition along with the stark realization that other similarly placed Asian neighbors are quickly closing the gap has forced BN to liberalize the economy. Reforms include rolling back affirmative actions towards the Malay majority and making it a priority to attract FDIs. For example, the requirement for minimum Malay ownership of companies in many sectors has been removed. Easing of equity caps and market access makes it easier for foreign businesses to set up shop in Malaysia. Another effort to facilitate international trade are the ongoing negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between Malaysia and the EU. Unfortunately, the FTA has stalled in recent months due to the uncertainty of elections.

In spite of these reforms and pro-business policies, Barisan Nasional has begun to wilt in recent years. Stories of corruption are an open secret. By admission of the government itself, Malaysia loses the equivalent of 2.5 billion euro every year due to corruption. Media freedom remains questionable. Ethnic tensions have not disappeared – the Chinese and Indian minorities are still frustrated with the remaining privileges for Malays. Then there is the electoral system. BN has been accused of many sins in relation to it. Many claim that BN designed the electoral system to work in its favor. For example, the prime minister can call elections whenever he chooses as there is no requirement for minimum campaign period. At General Elections 2008 the official election campaign was a mere 8 days. This puts opposition parties at a disadvantage because they can’t plan their campaign in advance. The opposition is also accusing BN of bribing voters with cash handouts, bonuses, subsidies and other monetary transfers, all using public money and disguised as government support. The authorities acted heavy-handedly against protests for electoral reform and got reproached at home and internationally for human rights violations.

What To Expect When You’re Expecting

Much like the actual date of the upcoming elections, the future after them is shrouded in mystery. The fog of uncertainty gets thicker if the opposition wins. Quite simply, no one knows what to expect with Pakatan Rakyat in power. Ideological tensions within PR could rip the coalition apart from the inside out, leading to political turmoil. Complete leadership overhaul can be expected in government administration and in government-linked companies – the engines of Malaysia’s economy. Would PR deliver its utopian campaign promises and if yes, how would the large bill for fulfilling them be paid? Is PR going to court international investors as actively as BN did? How successful would PR be in managing the tensions along ethnic fault lines?

There are too many questions and uncertainties which doesn’t inspire investor confidence. Due to election jitters Malaysia’s stock exchange index, the FBM KLCI, has already fallen sharply by 41 points since January. In a fluid global market uncertainty often means closing your wallet and looking for greener pastures somewhere else. There is certainly choice for investing elsewhere in the region with contenders like Indonesia, Cambodia and Thailand on the rise.

Business prefers stable, predicable countries with a strong rule of law. Barisan Nasional has proven it can maintain stability and create an environment attractive to both domestic and international investors. However, that may not be enough for ordinary Malaysian voters, many of whom are eager for change.

Nelly Stratieva is a project coordinator at a management consultancy in Kuala Lumpur.