By KAVALJIT SINGH

As India grapples with the Vodafone and 2G fallout, the Bilateral Investment Treaties it signed a few years ago are coming back to haunt it.

On April 17, British telecom giant Vodafone issued a notice of dispute to the Indian government, as a first step towards launching investment arbitration proceedings under the India-Netherlands Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) signed in 1995.

The telecom company filed the notice through its Dutch subsidiary, Vodafone International Holdings BV, asking the Indiangovernment to abandon or suitably amend the retrospective aspects of the proposed tax legislation under Finance Bill 2012 which allows tax authorities to reopen cases as far back as 1962. Vodafone has termed the retrospective tax proposals “denial of justice” and “a breach of the Indian government’s obligations” as they may allow the Indian authorities to collect Rs11,000 crore ($2.2 bn) in taxes over the company’s $11.2 bn acquisition of Hutchison Essar in 2007.

Growing line of cases

Vodafone’s notice is the latest in the growing line of cases where foreign investors are threatening to invoke international arbitration proceedings against India under the framework of BITs.

On February 28, Russian conglomerate Sistema sent a legal notice to the Republic of India threatening international arbitration proceedings under the India-Russia BIT (1994) if the government fails to settle the dispute related to revocation of its 21 telecom licences in an amicable way by August 28, 2012. The company claims that the cancellation of its licences by the Supreme Court is contrary to India’s obligations under BIT, including obligations to provide investments with full protection and security and obligations not to expropriate investments.

On February 2, the Supreme Court had ordered the cancellation of all 122 spectrum licences issued in January 2008 by the then Telecom Minister A. Raja. Out of these, 21 belonged to SSTL. In its judgment, the Supreme Court declared the allotment of spectrum “unconstitutional and arbitrary” and maintained that Mr. Raja “wanted to favour some companies at the cost of the public exchequer” and “virtually gifted away [an] important national asset.”

Following in the footsteps of Sistema, Norwegian telecom company Telenor also threatened to invoke the India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement to protect its investments.

New Delhi has yet to respond to these legal notices. Meanwhile, a recent arbitral tribunal award (White Industries Limited v. Republic of India) should serve as an eye-opener to the government.

In 1989, White Industries Australia Limited (WIAL) entered into a commercial contract with state-owned Coal India Limited (CIL) for supply of equipment and development of a coal mine for the Piparwar Project in Jharkhand. In 1999, however, contractual disputes arose between WIAL and CIL. As per the contract, WIAL demanded payment of its performance bonus while CIL demanded a penalty based on poor quality production and subsequently encashed White’s bank guarantee. The matter went to the International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of Arbitration and hearings began in London. In March 2002, the ICC issued an AU$4 million award in favour of WIAL.

In September 2002, CIL approached the Calcutta High Court challenging the ICC award. Within days, White Industries also approached the Delhi High Court to enforce the award. After WIAL’s appeal to the Calcutta High Court to dismiss CIL’s application was rejected, it moved the Supreme Court. In March 2006, the Delhi High Court stayed the enforcement proceedings. At present, the Supreme Court is hearing WIAL’s appeal and a final decision is awaited.

Incensed by judicial delays over the enforcement of the ICC award, WIAL invoked arbitration against the Government of India in July 2010 under the India-Australia BIT and argued that the delays amounted to a denial of justice in violation of several provisions of the treaty especially fair and equitable treatment (FET), free transfer of funds and expropriation. It also argued that India had failed to provide WIAL with “effective means” of enforcing rights and asserting claims.

It is important to note that the 1999 India-Australia BIT does not contain “effective means” standards or any other obligations dealing with delays in court process. However, this treaty contains the MFN clause which allowed WIAL to import more favourable provisions from other treaties signed by India. Specifically, WIAL drew upon a beneficial provision under Article 4 (5) of the India-Kuwait BIT which obliges India to provide “effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights with respect to investment.” By relying on the MFN clause, WIAL sought similar level of protection which Kuwaiti investors are given in India.

As per the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules, the three-member arbitral tribunal was constituted in July 2010 and hearings began in London. The tribunal passed its award on November 30, 2011. While dismissing WIAL’s allegations on violation of FET, free transfer of funds and expropriation, the tribunal held that the inability of the Indian judicial system to provide WIAL effective means to enforce its rights is a breach of India’s obligations under the India-Australia BIT. The tribunal awarded White Industries AU$4 million with interest.

Whether India will accept or challenge this ruling is still publicly unknown as the authorities have maintained complete silence over the issue. Nevertheless, the ramifications of this BIT award are far-reaching. It may encourage other foreign investors in India to take a similar route and seek compensation from the Indian government for non-implementation of commercial arbitration awards due to judicial delays. Given the fact that delays are endemic in our over-stretched judicial system, foreign investors may prefer to seek investment claims from the Indian government for the potential breach of the “effective means” provisions in the BITs.

Since India has signed over 80 bilateral investment treaties, it may open the floodgates for similar claims by foreign investors and the Indian government may end up paying full compensation.

Further, the BIT award raises an important policy concern: whether Indian courts have the sovereign right to intervene in arbitrations seated outside India.

Since there are conflicts between the treaty’s obligations and legitimate policy objectives, a carefully and well-worded investment treaty could avoid potential disputes. There are myriad policy options available to the Indian authorities when it comes to drafting new treaties or guiding the interpretation of existing ones.

First, India should initiate a comprehensive review of its existing investment treaties since recent cases have shattered the myth that its treaties maintain a fine balance between investor rights, investor responsibilities and regulatory space. Based on the review, India can seek suitable amendments in the existing treaties through bilateral negotiations. Since this process can be time consuming, a notification could immediately be issued by New Delhi giving its interpretation of various standards contained in the treaties. Second, policymakers should not allow investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms under which a foreign investor can initiate an international arbitration against India. In 2011, Australia announced its decision to not include investor-state dispute mechanisms under its trade agreements with the developing countries.

Third, to prevent “treaty shopping” by investors, policymakers could altogether remove the MFN clauses in future treaties or at least prohibit the possibility of importing such clauses from earlier treaties signed by India. Vague and controversial provisions such as national treatment, FET clauses, free transfer of capital, umbrella clauses should preferably be avoided or incorporated with explicit qualifications in the treaty.

Exception clauses

There are some exception clauses (such as national security clauses) which are exempt from the treaty’s obligations. Perhaps the time has come to enlarge the list of exception clauses by incorporating other policy priorities (such as taxation and financial stability) in the treaty.

Fourth, for a more balanced outcome, policymakers should avoid using words such as “creating favourable conditions for investments” in the preamble since it could be interpreted by arbitral tribunals as removing all restrictions in favour of foreign investors.

Fifth, the main objective of treaties should not be investment protection alone. There are legitimate policy objectives (such as sustainable development and financial stability) which should also be incorporated in the treaties. Policymakers should ensure that the state’s power to regulate business activities in the public interest is explicitly mentioned in the treaty’s preambles and other sections. No clauses should be included in the treaty which could bar the state from pursuing regulatory and other measures to pursue legitimate policy goals.

This article first appeared in The Hindu

Guest post by Senka Neuman Stanivukovi?, researcher at the University of Groningen.

As a part of novelized Enlargement strategy, the Commission has released a set of short videos to communicate the EU’s widening eastwards to the citizens. I suggest that the campaign not only prejudices against the Eastern members and to-be-members by portraying these as a derivative of the West, but it also verifies the East/West dichotomy as inherent to the EU’s political structure. In view of that, the article speaks up against the Westernization of European identity and the EU’s political order.

La révolution dévore ses enfants. Provided that the post-communist transition and subsequent 2004/2007 EU enlargement in conjunction with the pending accession of the Western Balkans was revolutionary, then the ten Central European and the seven Balkan countries are a textbook example of the above-cited Danton’s claim that the revolution devours its own children. In an era when discourses of the PVV, the Front National, and the Lega Nord are becoming part of the mainstream public narrative vis-à-vis the EU’s Ostpolitik, to argue that the Central and Balkan Europeans are victims of the Europeanization process is certainly not without controversy. The enlargement fatigue discourse, de facto euphemism for Western Europeans’ uneasy relationship with their Eastern counterparts, is unfit to grasp that the biggest weight of the accession process has been and continues to be carried by the acceding countries. The West can never be as tired from expanding as the East is tired from transitioning towards the West.

I argue that, notwithstanding the political rhetoric, in the context of the EU’s widening eastwards, the act of accession comes closer to Anschluss than to integration with the EU. Semiotics aside, for Central Europe integrating with the EU meant becoming more westernized than the West. Thus, in the same manner as Europeanization qua accession has reproduced the power relationship between Western Europe as certified Europe and Central Europe as its copie conforme, the newest Commission’s video clips on Southeast Europe, as a part of the pro-EU Enlargement campaign, portray this region as a derivative of old Europe and thus worth of EU membership.

But is this so problematic? Faced with an institutional vacuum subsequent to the fall of communism, these countries were provided with a brand new set of political and economic institutions and were additionally given the very much needed financial and administrative support for putting these institutions into practice. The role the EU has played and still plays in helping membership candidates in swapping communism for capitalism is undeniable. More importantly, the impetus for joining the EU always comes from the candidate state. Nobody has forced Central Europe to join the EU and nobody has forced these countries to comply with EU rules and norms. Yet now, almost a decade after the 2004 enlargement, while witnessing continuous economic growth and consolidation of democracy in most of the new member states, I dare to call out the EU for victimizing these countries.

The trick is that while being the engine behind the Europeanization process, the EU has simultaneously occupied this very process. It claims monopoly over democracy and capitalism, and, more importantly, it claims monopoly over Europe. In 1984, Kundera argued that Western Europe has kidnapped Europe. In the 1990s, by coupling the infamous Return to Europe with EU accession, the political nomenclatura of Central Europe and later of the former Yugoslav republics plus Albania has confirmed the EU’s hegemony over Europe. Put differently, in the same fashion as the West has stolen Europe during the Cold War, it has also stolen Europeanization in the post-Cold War period. In this context, the conformist non-members and to-be-members are labeled as good Europeans, whereas the recidivists are singled out as bad Europeans and, where geographical and cultural variables allow, as non-Europeans.

Again, this is still not problematic per se. If the West is the EU and the EU is Europe, by joining the EU, Central Europe and the Balkans confirm their place within Europe and break away from their troubled past. At the same time, for Western Europeans, this means ultimate confirmation of the supremacy of their system, which is no longer vulnerable to internal or external contestation. It seems as a win-win situation, or, to quote Fukuyama, the end of history. But it is not.

Scholarship on EU identity teaches us that the idea of Europe is established in opposition to the East. Ergo, Europeanism is not solely constructed in line with a Kantian ideal of a European federation nor does it solely progress towards constitutional patriotism basing itself on a set of commonly shared norms such as democracy, rule of law, solidarity, and respect for human rights. Au contraire, Kant himself sees Western European nation-states as a stepping stone for an emerging cosmopolitan order. European identity is therefore constructed vis-à-vis the Occident/Orient. The 20th century underpinned the West/East frontier awarding the Soviets with the role of the European other. Hereafter, pan-Europeanism was based on liberalism and capitalism and in opposition to an undemocratic and communist East. In 1938, Coudenhove-Kalergi framed the Paneuropa movement as, among others, a response to the emerging threat of Bolshevikization of Europe. This East/West dichotomy was furthe

r fortified against the background of the Cold War and was consequently embedded in the EU’s political order. When the founding fathers talked about the core of Europe, they talked of France, Britain, and Germany. Thus, the récidive of European ethnocentrism was sustained and reinforced by the bipolarity of the Cold War order. In effect, today’s EU exists as an artifact of Western Europe, defined in opposition to Eastern Europe. In this scenario, the former Soviet Block and the Balkans are read as the EU’s other or as the Zwischenland, at best.

To what extent the fall of the Iron Curtain and subsequent events have made this borderline fussier or have moved the frontier further eastwards is debatable. On the one hand, in 2004, Prodi talked about the unification of the Continent. On the other hand, to many, Vienna still seems much closer than Prague will ever be with the us vs. them mentality continuing to shape the European public and political discourse. Nowadays, we tend to debate the finalité of the European project, but is seems that qua identity, this matter has been settled already with the Peace of Versailles. I argue that by moving the EU’s border eastwards, we have not deconstructed the East-West schism. Rather, we have internalized it. The present debates indicate that the Cold War dichotomies are still very much alive and kicking. While contained by the Iron Curtain, today these divisions have moved into our backyard with the other becoming our first door neighbor.

For the countries that have taken the path of EU membership to establish their place in Europe this is tough luck. With EU membership failing to provide one with an external validation of one’s Europeanness, the enduring process of conforming to EU rules and norms is comparable to Sisyphus rolling the immense boulder uphill only to watch it fall down again. In an effort of becoming more Europeanized than the EU, the only thing these countries managed to establish is that they are more European than their first neighbor to the east. Consequently, the Central Europe of today and the Western Balkans of tomorrow are in a schizophrenic state due to a diametrical difference between the Ego and the Alter. Ultimately, this means that transition is a never-ending process.

With the above-developed discussion in mind, I would like to reflect upon the current enlargement campaign. The EU’s 2005 enlargement strategy, as a summary of the lessons learned from the big-bang enlargement, highlights the need of improved communication of the future accessions to the citizens. Consequently, in 2012, DG enlargement released a set of video clips under the motto of narrowing the existing democratic deficit by advertising the upcoming new members among the common folks. Particularly interesting is the release on Southeast Europe entitled So Similar, So Different, So European.

While escaping the hype of the more notorious Growing Together video, the ad on Southeast Europe is very much representative of the West-centrism in the EU’s order. In short, the add presents sights in Southeastern Europe such as the Lady of the Rock monastery, the Old Bridge of Mostar and the Zagreb National Theater to be identical to sights in Sweden, Italy, and Austria. The campaign is however a backhanded compliment to the essence and the uniqueness of Western Balkan identity. To be blunt, if the enlargement process reproduces the existing power relationships between the superior West and the backwards East writ large, this clip does exactly the same on a small scale. As such, it reinvents the Southeast against the image of the West in the same fashion as Central Europe was manufactured as a western corollary in the East throughout the 1990s. The arising narrative of the Western Balkans being good only if similar/comparable to France, Germany, the Netherlands etc. is st

ereotyping, patronizing and quite offensive. Unfortunately, however, with Western identity as a benchmark of certified Europe being deeply entrenched in the EU accession discourse, we often fail to see this.

The question, however, is to what extent going along is worth it? Already today, the West has monopolized European culture, history, arts, education, the understanding of progress, social order, democracy etc. Now, with the above-discussed clip in mind, we are even witnessing a monopolization of landscape. Sure, it is certainly more rewarding for one to see her country represented as the New France than the villain of European modern history. But, again, I ask, is it worth for the East to become more western than the West, when, in the eyes of those who matter, they will never be good enough?

Guest post by Elena Gerebizza, energy and climate finance officer at the ‘Campaign for the Reform of the World Bank’, an advocacy and campaigning group based in Rome, member of the Counter Balance coalition. She is co-author of the policy briefing “Beyond our Borders. A critique of the external dimension of the EU energy policy and its financing mechanisms” released in April 2012.

Tomorrow (20 April) concludes the Danish EU Presidency’s informal meeting of energy and environment ministers, where Commissioners for Environment Janez Potocnik, for Climate action Connie Hedegaard and for Energy Günther Oettinger gathered to discuss how best to orient the bloc’s environment and energy policies to ensure a ‘greener Europe to help solve the financial crisis’ . The meeting follows the publication in February of the EU’s Energy roadmap, in which the Commission outlined different scenarios to lead the energy transformation of Europe by 2050 .

While the roadmap has elements that could lead to decarbonising the European economy and reducing the amount of fossil fuels within the EU’s energy mix, it would be remiss to suggest that it is the solution to set the EU on a green path towards economic recovery. The EU must address its overreliance on fossil fuels, and in particular those that are imported from abroad.

Currently the EU imports up to 50 percent of the energy it uses, and already in 2007, the Commission predicted that “with ‘business as usual’ the EU’s energy import dependence will jump from 50 percent of total EU energy consumption today to 65 percent in 2030. Reliance on imports of gas is expected to increase from 57 percent to 84 percent by 2030, of oil from 82 percent to 93 percent.”

As outlined in the report “Beyond our Borders. A critique of the external dimension of the EU energy policy and its financing mechanisms,” Europe’s energy dependency not only has serious implications for the environment, human rights and development in countries that supply Europe’s energy needs but also creates rising insecurities in Europe as a consequence of the Union’s reliance on foreign energy sources. This scenario conflicts with EU climate change objectives to reduce emissions and provisions of the Lisbon Treaty with regards to sustainability and EU activities and policies that have an impact on countries outside the EU.

Energy, environment and climate change are integral to the economic and production considerations that Europe will chose in moving forward from the financial crisis, and defining this future means deciding today what type of infrastructure to construct in order to support a truly transformative agenda. This is not about allowing companies to chose the most inexpensive ways to reduce emissions, nor enforcing energy efficiency targets while using the emissions trading scheme to allow the continuation of business as usual.

On the contrary, this means redefining the role of Europe vis a vis its neighbours and its priorities in respect to external objectives of the Lisbon Treaty, opening space to discuss the actual energy needs in Europe and how society must be reorganised to overcome these challenges.

Energy infrastructure in Europe demands billions of euros in investments, largely a bill to be footed by European citizens via public financial institutions like the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. So it is therefore legitimate to ask what kind of economy this infrastructure serves and as well to ensure that these priorities remain high on the agenda in fora like the recent ministerial meeting in Denmark.

Guest post by Andy Langenkamp, political analyst for ECR Research and Interest & Currency Consultants.

Unemployment in the eurozone is at historic highs. Economic growth data are equally depressing while confidence is low among producers and consumers. In short, the stock market rallies of recent months are premature. The European “patient” will not get better unless politicians reassure markets through reform packages that force supersized governments to go on a healthy diet of innovation, entrepreneurship, responsible lending and borrowing, sustainable healthcare and affordable pension systems. The motto of recent years – muddling through – should be replaced by better buzz words. Why not determination and perseverance?

Voters will only get behind their governments if they think their leaders are competent, courageous, trustworthy, and not easily corrupted. They should radiate authority, been successful at the polls in a honest way, and truly resonate with the electorate. Politicians can only implement far-reaching measures if the rest of society regards them as legitimate.

Precisely this is lacking. Voters no longer trust elected politicians. More and more European countries are regularly in the grip of political scandal. Even Germany recently lost two presidents because they were mired in scandal. It is no longer possible to dismiss such developments as individual wrong-doings. By now, political institutions as a whole are being regarded with suspicion; not least because news of widespread inappropriate behavior by politicians is widely disseminated through traditional and social media. That politicians seem helpless in the face of political-economic crisis only makes matter worse. Confidence in political parties is at a very low ebb. Eighty percent of Europeans distrust political parties.

Owing to this crisis of confidence, centrist parties are losing ground rapidly. That voters tend towards parties on the fringes of the political spectrum hampers efforts to find a solution to the crisis. First, because coming up with a compromise is more difficult when a larger number of parties has a say; particularly if these parties are “eccentric”. Second, most parties that appeal progressively more to the electorate are not well-disposed towards European integration.

This euroscepticism suits many voters. Often, they loath the idea of cross-border adventures in an uncertain world as their own situation deteriorates. Seventy percent of Germans is against aid for Greece. In turn, there is growing resentment against German opposed austerity in the peripheral eurozone countries. In addition, voters have a low opinion of the EU. Of its four major bodies – the ECB, European Commission, European Council, and the European Parliament – only trust in the European Central Bank scores higher than 40% (41%).

If politicians are no longer to be trusted, how can they implement reforms that should get the member states on a sustainable footing? Populists and dissatisfied citizens will interpret every initiative as an attempt by the elite to ruin decent citizens; not as a step towards achieving a functional social-democratic welfare state. Politicians are inclined to inflate new bubbles in order to compensate for bubbles that have already burst.

Truth is, Europe has never broken out of its bubble. It still believes in utopia and is living its life as a ‘Lifestyle Superpower’. The quality of life is untenable with a welfare state that has grown out of all proportions (52% of global expenditure for social protection originates in Europe). Now, we are living in a – as PIMCO, the world’s largest mutual fund, calls it – “new normal” that requires a more moderate lifestyle. Only large-scale interventions – a much higher pensionable age, higher patient contributions to healthcare etcetera – and a complete restructuring of the public administration and labor market can keep a trimmed-down version of the existing welfare state alive. All other so-called “exit routes” will merely prolong the agony of “muddling through”.

Making progress requires leaders who are not afraid to stake their political careers. It may be a cliché but let’s look at Nelson Mandela for a minute. After he had taken office as president, Mandela was under huge pressure to abolish everything that represented South Africa’s national rugby team, the Springboks, because it was strongly associated with the apartheid regime. Mandela realized that to keep the country together he would have to go against his core constituency and allow the Springboks to continue. In the movie Invictus this was the subject of a poignant dialogue between Mandela and his adviser:

Mazibuko: You’re risking your political capital, you’re risking your future as our leader.

Nelson Mandela: The day I am afraid to do that is the day I am no longer fit to lead.

Only if leaders dare to risk their position will the eurozone be able to survive. For one thing is certain, many measures that need to be implemented are directly opposed to what voters want. In other words, politicians need to apply “tough love” and act in the long-term interests of their electorate instead of yielding to all its short-term demands.

For now, visionary leaders are extremely thin on the ground and there is only a very slim chance that voters and populist parties will have a change of heart. This political “poverty” will cause Europe to weaken politically and economically in the coming period. Only if politicians and voters get out of their bubble, there is chance that markets feel that fundamental change is in the air and will calm down.

Guest Post by Dan Luca

When it comes to involve and engage citizens in the decision-making process on a European level, there is confusion about terminology.

Some see “asking the interested citizens what they prefer” as active public participation. It is not: “asking the interested citizen” falls under consultation. Consultation is a top-down professional or bureaucrat-led process. At best, consultation produces choices from which the selected consultants can choose. Worst case scenario: community preferences are ignored, because they do not fit some preconceived model of “what the public needs”, designed in the minds of bureaucrats, politicians and professionals.

Participation is a process of setting up structures, within which professionals or bureaucrats become facilitators of a broad-based deliberative process. Participation is more difficult and time-consuming than consultation. It requires the leaders of the process to have the commitment to public participation and at the same time also the techniques to enact it. It requires skills in working with groups, but also skills in keeping the lobby group representatives or vociferous individuals to dominate and unduly influence proceedings.

Often enough there is big confusion between consultation and participation processes. People taking part in a consultation process can be disappointed and disillusioned when the results clearly show that their recommendations / opinions / ideas have not been taken up. So when questions like “why are citizens not engaged?” – Well, it’s just not structured to facilitate engagement.

Dan Luca,  Casa Europei

Guest post by Hristiana Grozdanova and Anna Maria Barcikowska.

Since the autumn of 2008, the financial crisis and its implications has dictated the EU policies. The pressures on EU governments to control expenditure continue to be enormous. Defence has not remain immune raising important questions how Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU can function in this new environment and even if it can survive austerity. Some commentators see it only as a question of choices – how much does defence matter and where does it stand in national priorities, missing a critical point: without a strong security and defence policy in the EU, underpinned by credible military capabilities, Europe risks becoming a marginalized, second-tier player.

On March 29, in his speech on Polish Foreign Policy for 2012, Radek Sikorski, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, painted a bleak scenario: “A divided Europe loses its chance to remain a key player in international trade and politics. Tired with defence spending stinginess and a general European inefficiency, the USA opt out of NATO. Russia fills the void left by the West in the East; China fills the void in Asia. The Arab world is engulfed by transformation crises. Europe is no longer a role model for anyone”.

This is evidently a worst-case scenario, but if EU wants to contribute to promoting and preserving peace and stability and use actively and effectively instruments at its disposal for crisis management and conflict prevention, European leaders will have to rethink their commitment to CSDP.

Radek Sikorski observed, based on the experience of the Polish Presidency of the EU (July – December 2011), that CSDP is unfortunately impossible to implement in a group of 27 member states and stressed that the EU must initiate tighter cooperation between willing countries.

This is perhaps the solution. Europe’s role in the world can only be sustained through enhanced defence cooperation and a group of like-minded Member States ready to drive CSDP forward can be much more effective. It can act as avant-garde that others will, hopefully, follow.

In December 2010, Poland together with France and Germany launched the “Weimar Initiative” making it clear that there is need to give a fresh impetus to CSDP and take bold decision to make it more cost-effective and cost-efficient at the same time. One of such bold decisions considered under Weimar Initiative was the proposal to establish permanent civil-military planning and command structures for EU operations. Infrastructure, personnel and expertise for planning, command and control exist in all countries and military organizations in the form of military headquarters. Those headquarters are the link between the political decision-makers and military organizations.

Unlike NATO, the EU has no permanent military headquarters and specific structures and responsibilities are split between the Union and its Member States. In practical terms, this means that when a military operation is to take place, the EU has to activate different entities ad hoc and bring them together. Therefore, having EU headquarters would help to overcome the present shortage of the system where to launch an operation and activate an Operational Headquarters (OHQ) a Council Decision is required each time. It would also significantly improve operational efficiency of EU crisis management and facilitate more effective use of resources. What is more, the EU can use the HQs of five of its Member States, or NATO structures or activate Operations Centre in Brussels.

This proposal, advocated vigorously for during Polish Presidency of the EU, failed to muster sufficient support, in particular due to strong opposition from the UK. However, it was not an entirely wasted effort as it led to a compromise agreement to activate the EU’s dormant ‘operations centre’. For the first time since it was created in 2007, the dormant operation centre has been put in practice to help conduct the EU’s operations in the Horn of Africa.

The difficulties to take forward the Weimar Initiative exposed the inherent problems of CSDP and the fragile balance between the need to collectively improve military capabilities and the concerns over national sovereignty and power. The Weimar initiative is not a new idea for the European Union. Similar initiatives have failed in the past due to lukewarm political support. If the EU wants to remain engaged in crisis management and carry – out complex civil-military tasks, European leaders have to finally pull their weight on security and defence.

The new US Defence Strategic guidance while reorienting towards Asia-Pacific suggests that Europeans have to do more not less, making clear that there will be no more free rides. If Europeans want the US to remain engaged and committed, they need to demonstrate a greater willingness to assume a larger share of the security and defence burden. To do so in the midst of the worst economic crisis in decades is a real challenge for CSDP and will require a serious effort and continuous political momentum to get it back on track.

Common Security and Defence Policy can only be as effective and ambitious as Member States want it to be. Rethinking CSDP in times of austerity and strategic shifts will require revisiting approaches and ideas that might previously have seemed politically unacceptable but now are a necessity. Radek Sikorski concluded in his foreign policy speech that stronger EU means offloading past burdens and past inhibitions. This is the way forward for CSDP.

Hristiana Grozdanova is an EU policy advisor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, working on issues related to Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.

Anna Maria Barcikowska is a Senior Officer at the European Defence Agency. The views expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Defence Agency.

Both are members of the Atlantic Council’s Young Atlanticist Working Group.
This article was also published here.

Guest post by Dmitry Chernyshenko, President and CEO of the Sochi 2014 Olympic Winter Games.

Sports ministers and stakeholders from across the EU met last week at the SportsVision2012 conference in Copenhagen, organised by the Danish Presidency of the EU, to discuss vibrant and healthy sport for all, with a focus on increasing participation in sports volunteering. In light of this I’d like to share our Russian experience of driving volunteering in preparation for the upcoming Sochi 2014 Olympic Games.

Our target is for 25,000 volunteers from across Russia to be the “face” of our Games, but most importantly to leave a lasting legacy for generations to come. The concept of volunteering was not as well developed or understood in Russia as it is in Europe. The number of Russian people regularly involved in volunteering represented only 9% of the population, compared to an average of 30% in Europe, so we had to work in a different environment.

The European Commission’s assessment of the European Year of Volunteering 2011 confirmed what we in Sochi already hoped for- the sports sector can mobilise more volunteers than any other. At the SportsVision2012 conference it was noted that there are 35 million people involved in volunteering around sports in Europe- a spirit that today is also catching Russia!

The concept of volunteerism was practically non-existent when we won the bid. In the EU, volunteering depends on each country’s initiatives and informal agreements. Some of these initiatives are particularly attractive, such as making sports centres and other sports facilities in certain cases exempt from land rental (Lithuania), and providing tax breaks for sports volunteers (Denmark).

To revive volunteering in Russian society, especially within the youth audience, we had to think of the most effective approach, which is probably unique to Russia. We have thus set an example for many other European countries, by enshrining volunteer status in law. In practice this means that volunteers in Russia have a legal right to medical insurance and to be reimbursed for costs related to their activities. We also worked hard to introduce a dedicated visa process for overseas volunteers travelling to Russia.

I believe this change contributed to the massive volume of applications we received at the opening of volunteer recruitment in February of this year. On the first day alone we had 10 000 bids from candidates. We are currently at over 56 000 applications, coming to a large extent from young people aged 17-22. And we now have 26 volunteers centre across Russia, all of them created with the cooperation of local educational institutions. They have proved to be a real driving force behind our events held all over the country, working on a daily basis to promote the spirit of volunteerism.

I consider volunteering around sport, however, as more than just a tool for improving public health, social inclusion and active citizenship at the national level. It is also a way of deepening relationships at the international level in line with the spirit of Olympism. Our volunteering drive has already reinforced our relationship with our British counterparts who are preparing for the 2012 Olympics, with over 100 Sochi Volunteers teaming up with London “Games Makers” to help with the organisation of the Olympic and Paralympic games.

Overall, volunteering is about getting people active, included and empowered- at the local, regional, national and international level. I sincerely hope that people from Russia and the Rest of Europe recognise this potential and support greater mutual cooperation through volunteering.

Guest post from Benedetta Berti, Gonca Noyan, Hristiana Grozdanova, Jelena Petrovic, members of the Atlantic Council’s Young Atlanticist NATO Working Group.

Since the end of the hostilities that led to the ousting of Muammar Qaddafi, Libya has been undergoing a post-authoritarian political transition. Although the internal drive for reforms is present, it remains unclear whether this transition will be successful. To guarantee such an outcome, the country needs to embark on substantial reforms. Among those, the implementation of extensive and successful reforms of the security sector (SSR) is particularly important.

In this context, the reform of the intelligence services is a vital type of first-generation SSR. If poorly implemented it may prevent the transition of the entire sector. To be successful, this process should be long-term, public and transparent. In addition, it should be considered a priority.

The Experience of the past

To offer guidelines on intelligence reforms to a country as unique and complex as Libya, one should search for valuable lessons from the closest matching region – the Western Balkans. The reasons for such a comparison are many. All Western Balkan countries are post-authoritarian, whether or not the dictatorship occurred during or during and after communist rule. Furthermore, most of them experienced internal violence, some even colliding with international forces.

The degree of success of the intelligence reforms in the Western Balkans varied between the different countries. In Macedonia—only a few of the reforms were publicized and a little was done to improve the image of the intelligence sector among the public. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the unification of two intelligence services under one state-level institution (the Intelligence and Security Organization) in 2004 represented great challenge due to political sensitivities and mistrust between the agencies, as well as because of their links to war criminals.

In the case of BiH, the EU relied on conditionality to accelerate the reforms of the intelligence sector, using negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement as a carrot to encourage and accelerate reform. Serbia and Montenegro’s experience can also teach a great deal about intelligence reforms by emphasizing the importance of personnel clean-up. In the Serbian and Montenegrin case, clean-up allowed to handle personnel with loyalties to the previous regime, to deal with internal resistance to reforms, as well as to address pre-existing relations between intelligence services and organized criminal groups.

The way forward

However, applying the lessons of the WB to Libya is a daunting challenge, as the country itself is still far from stable. Libya is highly fragmented internally —with competing tribal loyalties taking precedence over national identity—and lacks strong and functional central political institutions. In this sense, one of the toughest challenges of the National Transition Council (NTC) is to assert authority over tribes, cities, and provinces which had basically relied on self-ruling over the past four decades and which are now resisting attempts to bring about a measure of national centralized control.

Weak central government, proliferation of armed groups and militias, and widespread internal divisions and instability make lagged SSR unsurprising. This seems to be specifically the case when referring to reforms of the intelligence sector. It seems that little to no progress has been achieved in terms of rebuilding Libya’s intelligence sector.

However, rebuilding the secret services and bringing the previously highly insular and secretive intelligence sector under the civilian control of the NTC would be a crucial step in the right direction.

Steps not to be missed

Until the collapse of the previous regime, the Libyan secret services were closely associated with Qaddafi and, as such, the new authority faces the monumental challenge of rebuilding them completely, while bringing them, in parallel, under civilian democratic control. At the moment, the NTC has not made public any restructuring plan.

However, as the Western Balkan cases demonstrated, to be effective, secret services reforms should be conducted openly and transparently. The lack of publicly available information on Libyan secret services and their reforms (if already started) is not only discouraging but also clearly points out the first shortcoming of the SSR process.

In addition to openness, transparency, and involvement of the civil society, the focus should be also on including personnel clean-up, followed by a national process to deal with the archives and the information collected by the previous regime. This allows the transformation the secret services from a tool of the regime to a tool of the new state and its people protection.

Equally important, Libya should establish a solid framework to define roles and responsibilities of the new intelligence sector. This will serve as a guide to shape and place boundaries on the mandate of the intelligence services both within and outside the country. Such normative framework should not only clarify the mandate of the intelligence services, but it should also establish effective civil democratic control over this institution, in particular parliamentary oversight on their activities. The normative framework should also be in line with international human rights standards.

A new organizational structure for the intelligence services is also needed. Special attention should be paid to boosting the professionalism and experience of the personnel. The political authorities should invest time and political capital in recruiting and training. At the same time, in a sharply internally divided society like the Libyan one, it will be important for the new intelligence sector to rely on personnel that represents all the main internal tribal groups.

As a last point, receiving international support and assistance will also represent a step in the right direction. In the BiH case, there are studies praising the support received from Slovenia and Hungary and its role in helping the BiH SSR process. Both Hungary and Slovenia had previously experienced similar problems while reforming their own intelligence sectors, and therefore they were effective when assisting BiH in its own post-conflict transition. In the case of Libya, collaborating with international actors can be similarly beneficial.

To conclude, Libya is undergoing a particularly complex and difficult time, and its transitional success depends on the country being able to successfully implement a number of substantial reforms. Among those, rebuilding and reconfiguring of the intelligence sector is of utmost importance. This challenge should not be overlooked and postponed to a later stage of the post-revolutionary phase, as its success is deeply connected to the overall successful transition of the security sector and society as a whole.

Benedetta Berti is a fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies, a lecturer at Tel Aviv University, and the coauthor of the forthcoming book, “Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparative Study” (Johns Hopkins University Press 2012).

Gonca Noyan is a PhD candidate at the University of Illinois at Chicago and the co-founder & social media coordinator of Soft Power TR.

Hristiana Grozdanova is an EU policy advisor, working on issues related to Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU.

Jelena Petrovic is a PhD candidate at War Studies Dpt, King’s College London specializing in conditionality policy, NATO enlargement and security developments in the Western Balkans.

Un article envoyé par Hakima Fassi-Fihri, en charge de la Direction des Affaires Juridiques et des Ressources Humaines de l’Université Internationale de Rabat, et membre de son Directoire, et enseigne le droit des Affaires des Pays Arabes à l’Université d’Assas Paris II.

Un vent de polémique se ressent actuellement au Maroc, depuis le triste fait divers de la jeune Amina Filali, 16 ans, qui s’est donné la mort quelques mois après avoir été contrainte à épouser son violeur.

Un bref rappel des faits

Amina avait quinze ans lorsqu’elle a été violée par cet homme, plus âgé qu’elle de dix ans. Suite au viol, sa famille est allée porter plainte aux officiers de police de leur ville, Larache. Il semble qu’au lieu d’engager des poursuites à l’encontre de l’agresseur d’Amina, le tribunal lui ait recommandé la possibilité d’épouser sa victime, ainsi que le permet l’alinéa 2 de l’article 475 du Code Pénal marocain. Il semble que l’agresseur n’était pas disposé à prendre Amina pour épouse, mais que des arrangements ont ensuite eu lieu entre lui et la famille d’Amina aboutissant à l’option du mariage. La plainte ainsi retirée et les poursuites à l’encontre de l’agresseur arrêtées, le mariage d’Amina, mineure, avait par la suite été arrangé par les deux familles et autorisé par le juge, conformément aux dispositions du Code de la Famille, qui, depuis la réforme de 2004, soumet les mariages des mineures de moins de 18 ans à l’autorisation préalable et expresse du juge.

Suite au mariage, l’agresseur (désormais époux) continue à faire subir des violences physiques et sexuelles à son épouse/victime, probablement par dépit, étant donné qu’il se considérait acculé à conclure ce mariage, qu’il n’a accepté que pour échapper à la peine de prison. Il fait vivre ainsi pendant des mois un enfer à son épouse et victime, dans le but de la pousser au divorce, jusqu’au jour où, épuisée de subir autant de mauvais traitements, elle se donna la mort. Elle avait seize ans.

Malgré le fait qu’elle soit loin de revêtir un caractère inédit ou isolé au Maroc, l’histoire de cette jeune adolescente a ému au plus haut point les citoyens marocains. En effet, ce type de situation se compte en milliers de cas annuellement au Maroc (n’aboutissant pas toujours au suicide s’il en est), essentiellement en milieu rural et/ou illettré.  Toutefois, le dénouement dramatique et violent de ce fait divers a contribué à relancer le débat au sujet de l’abrogation de l’article 475, alinéa 2, du Code Pénal marocain, promulgué par le Dahir N° 1-59-413 du 28 Joumada II 1382 de l’Hégire (26 Novembre 1962) portant approbation du texte du Code Pénal (Bulletin Officiel n° 2640 bis du mercredi 5 juin 1963). L’article 475 est libellé comme suit :

« Quiconque, sans violences, menaces ou fraudes, enlève ou détourne, ou tente d’enlever ou de détourner, un mineur de moins de dix-huit ans, est puni de l’emprisonnement d’un à cinq ans et d’une amende de 200 à 500 dirhams.

Lorsqu’une mineure nubile ainsi enlevée ou détournée a épousé son ravisseur, celui-ci ne peut être poursuivi que sur la plainte des personnes ayant qualité pour demander l’annulation du mariage et ne peut être condamné qu’après que cette annulation du mariage a été prononcée. »

Une levée des boucliers

Les associations de défense des droits des femmes, au Maroc comme à l’international, ainsi que les forces progressistes de notre pays, estiment légitimement que cet article du Code Pénal, du fait qu’il blanchit l’agresseur sexuel de la mineure en lui permettant de se soustraire à la sanction pénale du crime de viol par la voie du mariage avec sa victime, constitue une incitation pour les agressions sexuelles dans la mesure où, d’une certaine manière, il œuvre à neutraliser l’action publique contre les auteurs des agressions sexuelles, et par là même à protéger ces agresseurs sexuels de la sanction pénale.

Il importe de noter que le viol est pourtant un crime reconnu comme tel et sanctionné par le Code Pénal marocain par une peine privative de liberté, et que le viol d’une mineure porte au double la sanction pénale à l’encontre de l’agresseur, comme il est indiqué dans l’article 486 du Code Pénal :

« Le viol est l’acte par lequel un homme a des relations sexuelles avec une femme contre le gré de celle-ci. Il est puni de la réclusion de cinq à dix ans.

Toutefois si le viol a été commis sur la personne d’une mineure de moins de dix-huit ans, d’une incapable, d’une handicapée, d’une personne connue par ses facultés mentales faibles, ou d’une femme enceinte, la peine est la réclusion de dix à vingt ans. »

Ainsi, dans la mesure où le viol est considéré comme un crime en droit pénal marocain (article 486 du Code Pénal), le fait que le ministère public, de par l’article 475, alinéa 2, soit amputé de son opportunité de poursuite dès lors que l’auteur du viol épouse sa victime (i.e : celle-ci ne déposant pas plainte ou ayant retiré sa plainte), est une idée insupportable sur le plan des droits humains les plus élémentaires.

En effet, il semble inconcevable que, de nos jours, il puisse exister des dispositions légales dont les agresseurs sexuels peuvent se prévaloir et qui les protègent des poursuites éventuelles du ministère public. Le bons sens imposerait plutôt que le ministère public et l’Etat garantissent en toute circonstance la réalisation des poursuites judiciaires contre les agresseurs qui portent atteinte à l’intégrité physique et à l’honneur de leurs victimes, abstraction faite des choix personnels effectués par les victimes par la suite envers leurs agresseurs.

Il me semble que l’Etat, de manière générale, a pour mission essentielle d’assurer en toute circonstance la sécurité des personnes, mineures ou non, et en particulier, ne devrait pas laisser impuni l’auteur avéré d’un crime aussi grave que le viol d’une mineure sous prétexte qu’il consent à épouser sa victime. D’autant que, l’auteur d’un viol répété, comme ce fut le cas de l’agresseur de la défunte Amina Filali, même en épousant sa victime, continue bien souvent à être une menace pour son épouse. Au Maroc, de nombreux témoignages vont dans le même sens : ce n’est certainement pas le mariage et encore moins l’impunité qui rendra l’agresseur sexuel inoffensif ou l’empêchera de récidiver. Bien pire encore, le fait que le mariage le protège contre d’éventuelles poursuites pénales par voie judiciaire serait de nature à le rendre encore plus dangereux, dans un pays où la notion de viol conjugal n’existe pas.

Un Code Pénal datant de 1962

Ceci étant posé, il me semble important de rappeler l’esprit dans lequel a été élaboré le Code Pénal promulgué en 1962, quelques années seulement après l’avènement de l’indépendance du Maroc en 1956, et notamment l’alinéa 2 de l’article 475 :

Le législateur du Code Pénal, texte d’essence patriarcale promulgué en 1962, a manifestement conçu l’alinéa 2 de l’article 475 pour protéger davantage l’honneur des familles plutôt que de se soucier de la prévention du viol, de son impact et celui du mariage avec l’agresseur, sur l’équilibre mental de la mineure victime de l’agression sexuelle. En effet, dans le domaine des mœurs, le Code Pénal marocain est un texte qui demeure hautement inspiré des principes de la tradition et de la morale d’essence religieuse. La nuance n’y est pas donnée en faveur du bien-être psychologique des mineures victimes de viols. Entre les lignes de l’alinéa 2 de l’article 475, c’est comme si le législateur recommandait à la victime et à l’agresseur sexuel pris en faute de contracter mariage, dans une noble volonté de préserver la famille de la victime et celle de l’agresseur du jugement impitoyable d’une société ultra conservatrice à l’égard de tout ce qui touche à la sexualité, et surtout à la sexualité féminine, considérée comme un sujet tabou encore de nos jours.

Il me semble essentiel de souligner que l’alinéa 2 de l’article 475 implique bien évidemment le consentement préalable de la jeune fille mineure victime du viol pour contracter mariage avec son agresseur, étant donné que le consentement de la future épouse est une condition essentielle et suspensive à la validité du mariage au regard du Code marocain de la Famille. Là encore, le bat blesse dans les faits, car dans la majorité des cas, l’adolescente n’a pas d’avis à donner, c’est généralement sa famille qui décide à sa place, en lui forçant la main bien souvent pour donner son consentement devant le juge, d’autant que le viol ne constitue pas légalement un empêchement au mariage. C’est précisément ce qui s’est passé pour la jeune Amina Filali, la menant à l’acte de désespoir que l’on connaît.

Le législateur de 1962 permettait ainsi aux jeunes filles violées, en se mariant avec leur agresseur, de retrouver l’honneur perdu (surtout si le viol s’accompagne de défloration, acte de déshonneur irréparable, considéré par le Code Pénal comme une circonstance aggravante du viol au titre de l’article 488 du Code Pénal), et le statut social « confortable » d’épouse légitime, qui les met à l’abri des regards inquisiteurs de la société moralisatrice dans laquelle elles vivent. Ceci est d’autant plus vrai lorsque le viol de la mineure donne lieu à une grossesse, avec à la clé un enfant illégitime qui n’aura jamais un statut égal à celui des autres enfants au regard du droit marocain. En effet, le Code de la Famille marocain (« Moudaouana ») prévoit dans de rares cas que le juge ordonne un test ADN lorsque la plaignante est mineure. Cependant, même lorsque le test ADN s’avère concluant, l’enfant sera toujours considéré comme illégitime si le prétendu père refuse de reconnaître la paternité. Par ailleurs, il est à noter que lorsque le juge ordonne le test ADN dans les cas de plaintes pour viol sur mineures ayant donné lieu à une grossesse illégitime, c’est avant tout dans le but de prouver le viol et non pour la reconnaissance de paternité, partant du principe que l’enfant occasionné par un acte sexuel hors mariage n’a pas droit à la reconnaissance…

De ce fait, le mariage entre la victime mineure et son agresseur sexuel selon l’esprit de l’alinéa 2 de l’article 475 du Code Pénal se présente bien souvent aux familles comme l’arrangement opportun, la solution la plus appropriée pour préserver l’honneur de la société et la moralité publique, au détriment des droits des personnes, des femmes et des enfants. L’agresseur accepte la proposition du mariage pour échapper à la prison, la victime mineure en fait de même pour préserver l’honneur de la famille, et chacun sait bien que ce couple improbable n’aura aucun avenir. Mais qu’importe, puisqu’au regard de la société, un bon mariage vaut bien mieux qu’une plainte déposée et un procès à scandale, humiliant pour les deux familles concernées.

Ceci est d’autant plus vrai que le viol est le plus souvent vécu par la victime avec un sentiment de honte et de culpabilité, étant donné que dans les faits, la jeune femme/fille est encore bien souvent considérée comme celle qui, par son comportement, a attiré l’agresseur vers l’acte du viol. D’ailleurs, il est si fréquent que les auteurs d’agressions sexuelles nient leurs faits, prétendant que la victime était consentante, qu’il n’est pas rare que les autorités judiciaires tentent de rejeter la faute sur la victime, de la débouter de sa plainte faute de preuves (que bien souvent elle est censée apporter), voire de la poursuivre, lorsqu’elle est non mineure, sur la base de la débauche, c’est-à-dire qu’elle devient coupable d’avoir déclaré avoir eu une relation sexuelle hors de l’institution du mariage. De victime de viol, la plaignante devient alors coupable de débauche, punissable au regard de la loi pénale marocaine, au titre de l’article 490 du Code Pénal (!!!). En outre, même lorsque le viol sur la non mineure est avéré et que l’agresseur sexuel est poursuivi par voie judiciaire au pénal, les peines d’emprisonnement à son encontre sont dans les faits bien loin de ce qui est cité dans l’article 486 du Code Pénal, puisqu’elles varient généralement entre dix huit mois et trois ans de réclusion…

Il n’en reste pas moins que nombreuses d’entre ces femmes savent d’avance que le mariage ne pourra pas marcher, mais elles savent aussi qu’en cas de divorce, elles seront toujours mieux considérées en société que si elles demeuraient des filles célibataires violées, ou des mères célibataires d’enfants issus d’un viol, qui seront privées à jamais de la chance de trouver un mari. Il est nécessaire de garder à l’esprit qu’au regard du droit marocain, comme dans certains milieux sociaux au Maroc, une femme ne peut avoir que le statut de célibataire (entendre par cela être vierge), de femme mariée, de divorcée ou de veuve. Autrement dit, tout autre statut n’a pas sa place et ne peut apporter que malheur ou déshonneur.

En quelques sortes, le mariage entre l’agresseur sexuel et sa victime mineure vient dédouaner non seulement le crime, mais fait disparaître à jamais la sanction aussi. Il permet de tout recommencer à zéro, comme si rien ne s’était jamais passé, comme si la victime et son agresseur n’avaient aucun ressenti envers ce qui est arrivé, et comme s’ils pouvaient commencer une vie conjugale avec pour point de démarrage un viol sur mineure.

In fine, il est poignant de constater à quel point, que ce soit en société ou à travers l’alinéa 2 de l’article 475 du Code Pénal, la préservation de « l’honneur » des familles est privilégiée au détriment des droits humains les plus basiques de la victime mineure du viol, tels sa dignité, son intégrité corporelle et mentale, ou encore son ressenti envers son agresseur.

Une réforme nécessaire

Afin d’avoir un texte dont la priorité est le respect et la garantie des libertés individuelles et des droits fondamentaux de l’être humain, une réforme du Code Pénal de 1962 s’impose aujourd’hui.

Depuis les années 2000, les associations de défense des droits humains et des droits de la femme au Maroc ont longtemps levé les boucliers contre certaines dispositions non égalitaires ou abusives du Code Pénal, dont l’alinéa 2 de l’article 475. En réponse à cela, les différents gouvernements depuis le début des années 2000 ont émis des promesses plus ou moins appuyées pour faire aboutir une proposition de texte visant à réformer le Code Pénal de manière plus équitable, qui soit en ligne avec les droits de l’Homme, et qui soit plus conforme au contexte socioculturel marocain d’aujourd’hui, mais sans que cela ne donne lieu à l’ébauche d’une réelle réforme en la matière.

Entre temps, les situations dramatiques de violences à l’égard des femmes sur le terrain perdurent au quotidien, et les agressions sexuelles sur les filles mineures aboutissant à des mariages arrangés entre victime et agresseur sont légion, donnant lieu à des situations humaines bien souvent insoutenables, à l’instar de ce qui s’est passé au mois de mars 2012 à Larache avec le suicide de l’adolescente Amina Filali.

Je pense qu’il est grand temps que le sujet soit remis à l’ordre du jour, malgré le fait que certaines déclarations de politiques marocains aujourd’hui au pouvoir ne soient guère encourageantes, à l’image de cette femme politique du Parti Justice et Développement (parti islamiste modéré faisant partie de la majorité parlementaire depuis les élections législatives de novembre 2011), qui déclarait dernièrement d’une part que, s’il est vrai qu’un mariage dans des circonstances similaires à celles d’Amina Filali serait voué l’échec, il ne fallait cependant pas oublier la nature de notre société, et prendre en compte les familles et l’entourage immédiat de la jeune fille violée, qu’elle soit mineure ou majeure ; et d’autre part, que l’article 475 du code pénal n’allait pas être abrogé du jour au lendemain sous la pression de l’opinion publique internationale, et que parfois le mariage de la violée à son violeur ne lui portait pas un réel préjudice.  Sans vouloir entrer dans un plaidoyer à l’encontre de ce type de déclarations, et nonobstant la réalité du fait que les résistances au changement feront toujours partie de l’équation dans notre société, il est du devoir des forces progressistes de notre pays de sensibiliser tout un chacun sur l’urgence et la nécessité d’adopter une législation qui protège réellement les droits élémentaires des femmes et ceux de leurs enfants, et qui les préserve notamment des comportements violents commis à l’encontre de leur intégrité physique et corporelle, et de ce fait, à leur dignité en tant qu’êtres humains.

Depuis le décès de la jeune Amina, des centaines de marocains ont manifesté dans la rue, et s’expriment par centaines de milliers sur les réseaux sociaux, pour réclamer une véritable réforme du texte pénal, avec pour objectif de sensibiliser le gouvernement de Sa Majesté pour préparer les projets de loi qui s’imposent aujourd’hui à nous, notamment en matière de protection des mineures contre le viol. A cette occasion, l’Unicef a appelé au respect de la Convention Internationale des Droits de l’Enfant et plus particulièrement de son article 3 qui dispose que : « Dans toutes les décisions qui concernent les enfants, qu’elles soient le fait des institutions publiques ou privées de protection sociale, des tribunaux, des autorités administratives ou des organes législatifs, l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant doit être une considération primordiale. »

L’organisme international UNICEF recommande également une application stricte de l’article 12 de ladite Convention qui  donne à l’enfant la possibilité d’être entendu dans toute procédure judiciaire ou administrative le concernant. En particulier, dans un communiqué publié le lundi 19 mars 2012, quelques jours seulement après le suicide d’Amina Filali, l’Unicef a rappelé qu’un Rapport produit conjointement par le FNUAP et l’UNICEF recommande le renforcement de la protection des enfants et des femmes victimes de violences sexuelles, ainsi que des peines plus fortes contre les auteurs d’agressions sexuelles. A cet égard, un représentant de l’Unicef au Maroc a indiqué que ce Rapport faisait l’objet d’un travail par les experts et juristes du Ministère de la Justice visant à proposer des amendements notamment au Code Pénal marocain en vigueur. La même source a indiqué que ce Rapport questionnait notamment l’article 475 du Code Pénal en le considérant non favorable à la protection des droits des enfants et des femmes.

A propos du cas d’Amina Filali, l’UNICEF, à l’image de nombreux citoyens marocains et associations de défense des droits des femmes et de l’enfant, s’est légitimement interrogé sur ce qui s’est réellement passé lors du dépôt de la plainte après le viol et lors du mariage d’Amina avec son agresseur. Amina a-t-elle été entendue par tous les protagonistes de l’affaire ? A-t-elle exprimé librement son souhait de se marier avec son agresseur ? Ses parents, le juge, ont-ils cherché à recueillir son consentement libre et éclairé ? Amina a-t-elle été associée à la prise de décision qui a définitivement scellé son sort?

Un travail colossal au niveau des mentalités reste à faire

Au delà du fait que je pense que tout auteur d’un crime doit être poursuivi et sanctionné pénalement, que la question des droits de l’Homme est la pierre angulaire de la réforme à initier en matière de réglementation pénale au Maroc, que l’honneur est une notion à redéfinir en faveur de la dignité de la mineure victime de viol en tant qu’être humain, que son intégrité mentale et physique sont aujourd’hui à mettre en priorité devant l’image sociale de sa famille, je demeure bien consciente du fait que l’abrogation de l’alinéa 2 de l’article 475 du Code Pénal à elle seule n’aura pas pour conséquence de révolutionner les esprits de la frange de la société marocaine qui adhère à l’esprit du texte actuel.

L’abrogation de l’alinéa 2 de l’article 475 du Code Pénal ne fera pas cesser du jour au lendemain les mariages arrangés entre les victimes et leurs agresseurs pour « réparer » l’acte d’agression et restaurer devant la société l’image des familles concernées. Toujours au nom du principe sacré de la sauvegarde de « l’honneur » des familles, la société trouvera toujours le moyen de réparer les violences faites aux femmes (mineures ou non) par une inventivité créatrice infinie, au mépris parfois des principes les plus basiques du respect de la dignité humaine.

Un travail colossal de déverrouillage des mentalités s’impose au plus profond de notre société, sans déni aucun de notre identité nationale ni religieuse.

Un travail indispensable, touchant au rapport à la femme, à son statut ; au respect de sa liberté, de ses droits élémentaires ; à sa place au sein du couple, au sein de la famille et au sein de la société ; à sa place non seulement en tant qu’épouse, mère, fille, élève, ou sur les lieux de travail, mais avant tout en tant que personne humaine pensante et agissante, devant être traitée en société avec les mêmes égards que ceux qui sont réservés à l’homme, et devant bénéficier des mêmes droits que lui, pas seulement dans les textes, mais sur le terrain aussi.

Un travail essentiel de prise de conscience qui doit commencer au sein de la cellule familiale, dès le plus jeune âge, et qui doit nécessairement être relayé par les éducateurs et enseignants à l’école primaire et secondaire, à l’université, sur les lieux de travail, et au sein de l’appareil étatique dans son ensemble, à commencer par l’appareil judiciaire et celui de l’éducation publique et privée.

Un travail nécessaire et urgent, qui touche à réajustement des comportements des hommes envers les femmes, que ce soit au sein de la famille, du couple, mais aussi sur les lieux de travail et en société.

Ce travail de longue haleine est en partie de la responsabilité de l’Etat, mais il est aussi de la responsabilité de chaque citoyen marocain qui pense que le développement du Maroc passe par la voie des idées progressistes. L’émanation de ce travail ne peut venir que des individus, aucun appareil étatique ne peut réussir cette mission sans l’adhésion des composantes les plus infimes de la société.

En conséquence, si une évolution au niveau des mentalités ne se réalise pas en parallèle avec la réforme du texte pénal, l’application sur le terrain d’une éventuelle réforme progressiste de ce texte s’avérera ardue, voire impossible, et c’est toute la société qui en sera la victime.